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The current anti-corruption campaign in China shows no sign of end-
ing any time soon. So far tens of thousands of ofﬁcials have been in-
vestigated by the disciplinary organs of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), resulting in sentences of warning, demotion or dismissal from 
Party positions. Some of the worst cases of corruption have been handed 
over to the state to be handled by the judicial system. This included the 
high-proﬁle case of Bo Xilai, who received a suspended death sentence 
for his corrupt activities. So far more than 130 ministerial-level ofﬁ-
cials have been investigated and purged, including Zhou Yongkang, a 
former member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Head of the 
Party's Political Legal Commission. Most recently, the anti-corruption 
campaign has targeted Sun Zhengcai, a member of the Politburo and 
Party Secretary in Chongqing.  The downfall of Sun Zhengcai has drawn 
huge attention in China and abroad, as Sun was widely regarded as a 
serious candidate for the position of Secretary General of the CCP when 
Xi Jinping steps down in 2022. 
How has corruption developed to such a serious extent in China? 
What are the causes and roots of corruption among Chinese ofﬁcials? 
Why are many ofﬁcials in China able to engage in corruption for such 
long periods before being subject to investigation? What does the evolu-
tion of corruption in China tell us about the nature of the Chinese politi-
cal-economic system? These and many more questions are discussed 
in Minxin Pei's new book, which is the most detailed examination of 
corruption in China published in recent years.
The empirical basis of Pei's book is the published accounts of more 
than 250 ofﬁcials penalized for corruption. He divides the cases into 
several different categories including 'selling and buying of positions', 
'corruption involving ofﬁcials and businessmen', 'collusive corruption 
in SOEs', 'collusion between law enforcement and organized crime', 
'cases of corruption involving judges' and 'cases of corruption involv-
ing ofﬁcials in regulatory enforcement agencies'.  Some of the cases 
involve dozens or even hundreds of ofﬁcials. In Maoming, a town in 
Guangdong province, more than 200 ofﬁcials including the local Party 
secretary and head of police were involved in buying and selling of 
positions (maiguan maiguan).  Pei's account highlights all the details, 
down to the corrupt ofﬁcials' single or multiple mistresses, drinking 
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parties and sex orgies. Often their families are also deeply involved in 
corruption.
Pei claims that the Chinese political and economic system is char-
acterized by crony capitalism, which he deﬁnes as an 'instrumental 
union between capitalists and politicians designed to allow the former 
to acquire wealth, legally or otherwise, and the latter to seek and retain 
power' (7).  He claims that at the heart of crony capitalism one ﬁnds the 
'collusion of elites'.  He also argues that elite collusion in any meaning-
ful sense did not emerge until the early 1990s. Collusive corruption is 
more destructive than individual corruption because it destroys the 
organizational and normative fabric of the state. It is more difﬁcult to 
detect and produces greater ﬁnancial gains for those engaged in such 
behaviour.
Pei admits that China is not the only country that has evolved into a 
system characterized by crony capitalism. However, the key difference 
between China's crony capitalism and its variants in, for example, the 
former Soviet Union is that the looting of state-owned property took 
place in the Soviet Union after the collapse of the communist regime, 
whereas in China this phenomenon takes place while the CCP and the 
communist system are still in place. Moreover, appropriation of state-
owned assets in the Soviet Union took place in a highly centralized man-
ner, whereas looting in China takes place in a much more decentralized 
manner. A third key difference is that theft of state-owned property in 
the Soviet Union happened as a one-time event, whereas it is an ongo-
ing process in China.  This is related to the incomplete and ambiguous 
nature of property right reforms in China, which make it possible for 
corrupt ofﬁcials to operate in a grey zone of partial property rights.
Pei presents an interesting discussion of various forms of collusion: 
vertical collusion, outsider-insider collusion, and horizontal collusion 
among insiders. The principal form of vertical collusion is 'buying and 
selling of positions'. Party chiefs in China wield decisive power in per-
sonnel matters. This is related to the nomenklatura system, according 
to which higher-level party organizations are in charge of personnel 
appointments at the next-lower level. Cash and various forms of gifts 
are used by ofﬁcials who aspire to be promoted. Once they are promoted 
as a result of bribery, they will of course try to recoup their expenses by 
engaging in 'buying and selling positions' themselves. Outsider-insider 
collusion is especially used by private businessmen who approach Party 
ofﬁcials in order to make them part of a network of corruption. Hori-
zontal collusion among insiders is likely to take place among colleagues 
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in a government agency or public institution. Often the execution of a 
corrupt deal or act will depend on the cooperation of a number of in-
siders in the same government agency. Often ofﬁcials at the same level 
are in a position to delay or obstruct each other's decisions. Therefore 
horizontal collusion can be necessary to overcome a mutual veto. 
One of the key ﬁndings in this study is that participation in collusive 
corruption in SOEs yields comparatively high returns. Pei reports that 
the average amount of corruption for local ofﬁcials selling ofﬁces and 
undertaking other corrupt activities is 6.45 million yuan over a career, 
while for SOE leaders it is almost 30 million yuan. Collusive corruption 
in SOEs is mainly committed by senior executives, i.e. the chairmen, 
presidents or general managers (157).  Apparently, corruption is more 
common in large SOEs.
According to Pei, bribery, embezzlement and misappropriation of 
funds are examples of corrupt practices that are bound to undermine 
the organizational norms of the Party-state. Collusive networks subvert 
the political authority of the Party-state and weaken the CCP's internal 
unity. In fact, Pei argues that his ﬁndings challenge the established 
theory of 'authoritarian resilience' (264). This theory rests on political 
loyalty, integrity and the capabilities of the elite. Instead he ﬁnds de-
generation of norms and disloyalty to the regime: in short, pervasive 
institutional decay.
In his conclusion, Pei warns that the process of regime decay may 
pave the way for an 'opportunistic strongman' (265) who can destroy his 
enemies through tactics disguised as anticorruption efforts. Undoubt-
edly Pei has present Party general secretary Xi Jinping in mind. Thus 
Pei is not necessarily in favour of the ongoing anti-corruption campaign 
since it can be used by Xi Jinping to usurp more power and thereby 
hasten regime decay.
It is important to note that Pei's study is based on open sources. In 
fact, all the cases he presents have been previously reported in Chinese 
newspapers, magazines, news agency reports, government documents, 
ofﬁcial press releases or court documents. Thus, the study is an instruc-
tive example of how far the researcher can take his/her research by 
relying on publicly available Chinese sources. 
However, the fact that the Chinese authorities are not hiding this in-
formation, but are instead accepting its public availability, gives cause 
for some optimism as to the future of the Chinese political system. It 
is also clear that these examples of corruption are only one part of the 
picture when analysing the stability and resilience of Chinese political 
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institutions and administrative norms. Clearly, there are also dedicated 
and uncorrupted elements among Chinese ofﬁcials. If this were not 
the case, it would be very hard to explain the great progress China has 
made in recent decades.
With these caveats, I do not hesitate to recommend this thoroughly 
researched and well-written study of an extremely important issue that 
has great impact upon China's future economic and political develop-
ment trajectory.
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